Since the beginning of 2018, the United States has undertaken unprecedented tariff increases, with one goal of these actions being to boost the manufacturing sector. In this paper, we estimate the effect of the tariffs-including retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners-on manufacturing employment, output, and producer prices. A key feature of our analysis is accounting for the multiple ways that tariffs might affect the manufacturing sector, including providing protection for domestic industries, raising costs for imported inputs, and harming competitiveness in overseas markets due to retaliatory tariffs. We find that U.S. manufacturing industries more exposed to tariff increases experience relative reductions in employment as a positive effect from import protection is offset by larger negative effects from rising input costs and retaliatory tariffs. Higher tariffs are also associated with relative increases in producer prices via rising input costs. * We are grateful to Vivi Gregorich for superb research assistance. We thank Ryan Monarch and participants at the 2018 Mid-Atlantic Trade Workshop at Duke for useful comments. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Board of Governors or its research staff.
Introduction
The unprecedented increase in tariffs imposed by the United States against its major trading partners since early 2018 has brought renewed attention to the economic effects of tariffs.
While there are already vast theoretical and empirical literatures documenting the effects of changes in trade policy, it is not clear how prior estimates apply to the present day when there are virtually no modern episodes of a large, advanced economy raising tariffs in a way comparable to the U.S. in 2018-2019. Further complicating the process of estimating the effects of tariffs is the rapid expansion of globally interconnected supply chains, in which tariffs can have impacts through channels beyond their traditional effect of limiting import competition.
Another important feature of these tariffs is that they were imposed, in part, to boost the U.S. manufacturing sector by protecting against what were deemed to be the unfair trade practices of trading partners, principally China. Thus, while existing research has mostly documented negative consequences of the tariff increases on the broad economy-including higher prices, lower consumption, reduced business investment, and drops in the valuations of affected firms-some might view these effects as an acceptable cost for achieving the policy aim of ensuring more robust manufacturing activity in the United States.
This paper provides the first comprehensive estimates of the effect of recent tariffs on the U.S. manufacturing sector. A key feature of this analysis is accounting for the different ways that tariffs could affect manufacturers in the presence of global trade and supply chain linkages. On the one hand, U.S. import tariffs may protect some U.S.-based manufacturers from import competition in the domestic market, allowing them to gain market share at the expense of foreign competitors. On the other hand, U.S. tariffs have also been imposed on intermediate inputs, and the associated increase in costs may hurt U.S. manufacturers' competitiveness in producing for both the export and domestic markets. Moreover, U.S. trade partners have imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports of certain goods, which could again put U.S. firms at a disadvantage in those markets, relative to their foreign competitors.
Disentangling the effects of these three channels and determining which effect dominates is an empirical question of critical importance.
Toward this end, we construct straightforward industry-level measures of exposure to each of these three channels. We measure the import protection channel as the share of domestic absorption affected by newly imposed tariffs. We account for declines in competitiveness associated with increased input costs as the share of industry costs subject to new tariffs.
Finally, we measure an industry's potential exposure to retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners as the share of industry-level exports subject to new retaliatory tariffs. We construct these measures using detailed data on each industry's input-output structure, trade flows, and shipments, as well as information on the set of products covered by both U.S. and foreign retaliatory tariffs. We then relate the measures for these three channels of tariff exposure to monthly data on manufacturing employment, output, and producer prices.
We employ a differences in differences approach that compares outcomes in industries that are more subject to each of the three tariff channels to those that are less affected.
We begin by regressing the industry-level outcomes on interactions of measures of the three channels with a set of month dummies, which allows us to observe the timing of any effects of tariffs, while also determining whether more-exposed industries were on differential trends prior to the start of trade tensions. We adopt two approaches to control for potential pretrends, including using detrended measures of the dependent variables, and differencing out the effect of the pre-trends as in Finkelstein (2007) . Industry and month fixed effects in the regressions control for time-invariant characteristics of industries and aggregate shocks. In addition, we control for industries' import share of domestic absorption and export share of shipments to allow for the possibility, for example, that more internationally exposed industries may perform differently at different stages of the business cycle.
We find that tariff increases enacted in 2018 are associated with relative reductions in manufacturing employment and relative increases in producer prices. In terms of manufacturing employment, rising input costs and retaliatory tariffs each contribute to the negative relationship, and the contribution from these channels more than offsets a small positive effect from import protection. For producer prices, the relative increases associated with tariffs are due solely to the rising input cost channel. We find little evidence for a relationship between industrial production and any of the three tariff channels considered.
In terms of economic significance, we find that shifting an industry from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in terms of exposure to each of these channels of tariffs is associated with a reduction in manufacturing employment of 1.4 percent, with the positive contribution from the import protection effects of tariffs (0.3 percent) more than offset by the negative effects associated with rising input costs (-1.1 percent) and retaliatory tariffs (-0.7 percent). For producer prices, we find that an interquartile shift in exposure to rising input costs is associated with a 4.1 percent increase in factory-gate prices. These estimates provide information about the responses of more-exposed relative to less-exposed industries, but do not reflect general equilibrium effects of the tariff increases.
The results point to the importance of increased costs from tariffs on inputs as a mechanism through which tariffs affect the manufacturing sector, with this channel yielding highly statistically significant effects for both employment and producer prices. The importance of this channel in our estimates is consistent with the purposeful targeting of intermediate inputs for early rounds of U.S. tariffs in order to avoid tariffs on consumer goods, as discussed in section 2. Furthermore, the results point to the relevance of global supply chains when evaluating the effects of tariffs.
These results necessarily represent short-term effects of tariffs, and the longer-term impli-cations of trade tensions may differ from those estimated here. For example, some adjustment to the imposition of tariffs may take time as firms complete previously agreed-upon contracts with customers and suppliers. Furthermore, some effects may dissipate if tariffs were to return to their previous levels, while others may be longer-lived. We also note that this paper focuses specifically on realized changes in tariffs, but does not explicitly consider the effects of increased uncertainty about future trade policy. Indeed, the increase in uncertainty generated by recent rounds of tariff increases may be one of the ways in which the effects of past policy persist. This paper builds on the evolving literature examining the effects of recent global trade tensions on the U.S. economy. Early work in this literature includes Amiti, Redding and Weinstein (2019) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) who find near-complete pass-through of U.S. tariff increases to domestic prices, implying welfare losses, though of a relatively small magnitude. Cavallo et al. (2019) show that product composition appears to be a key determinant in the differences in tariff pass-through between U.S. imports and U.S. exports during the 2018-2019 tariff escalation, while also showing that the majority of U.S. tariff increases are being absorbed by U.S. retailers. Flaaen, Hortaçsu and Tintelnot (2019) Focusing on the effects of retaliatory tariffs on consumption, Waugh (2019) finds that counties specializing in industries subject to Chinese retaliatory tariffs experienced reductions in new auto sales. Blanchard, Bown and Chor (2019) also find that these retaliatory tariffs can explain a shift in voting away from Republican House candidates in the 2018 election.
In research focusing on uncertainty regarding tariff rates, Caldara et al. (2019) find that increases in measured trade policy uncertainty reduce investment in firm-level and aggregate data. Other research (Reyes-Heroles, Traiberman and Van Leemput 2019) notes that the effects of tariff actions by major trading countries can also have implications for the trade patterns of emerging market economies.
Although we highlight the recent and rapidly expanding literature on the 2018-2019 tariffs, the ideas of accounting for retaliatory tariffs and supply chain effects of tariffs go back decades. Early examinations of optimal tariffs given the potential for retaliation can be found in Kaldor (1940) and Johnson (1953) . The counteracting effect of tariffs on intermediate inputs used in further domestic production-the rising input cost channel described abovewas highlighted in Balassa (1965) and also Corden (1966) . The scale of the 2018-2019 tariffs, the increased availability of data, and the immensely expanded network of global supply chains permits a quantitative examination of these channels that was not possible before.
Our paper makes several contributions to the existing literatures. First, we explicitly measure and estimate the effects of several channels through which tariffs could affect manufacturers, which we find to be important given that tariffs can simultaneously protect an industry's output, while raising prices for its inputs and subjecting it to retaliation in its export markets. Second, we focus specifically on the manufacturing sector, the sector whose output and employment were targeted to be boosted by tariffs. We believe this focus is important, because our results indicate that tariffs have been a drag on employment and have failed to increase output. Third, we provide the first simultaneous examination of the output, employment, and price effects of the 2018-2019 tariffs in a particular sector.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the timing of recent trade actions by the U.S. and its trading partners, lists the data sources used in the analysis, and details the calculation of the three measures of exposure to tariffs. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy and results and Section 4 concludes.
2 Background, Data, and Industry-Level Measurement
Recent Trends in U.S. Manufacturing
We begin by providing some brief background on recent trends in manufacturing activity in the period leading up to and during the imposition of tariffs. Toward that end, Figure   1 displays manufacturing employment and production from January 2017 to August 2019, with each data series converted to an index that equals 100 in January 2018, just before the imposition of the first round of new tariffs. As indicated in the Figure, manufacturing employment and output increased at a robust pace in 2017 and, indeed, through much of 2018. Since the end of 2018, however, manufacturing output has declined noticeably and manufacturing employment growth has stalled. Given this inflection point, which came after the imposition of substantial tariffs by the U.S. and its trading partners, it seems reasonable to ask whether the tariffs implemented or planned in 2018 played some role in this manufacturing slowdown. Given the patterns evident in Figure 1 , it is now helpful to provide additional detail on the timing of the implemented tariffs we study. 
Timing of U.S. and Retaliatory Tariffs
The escalation in tariffs beginning in 2018 can be classified under three separate actions, which occurred on distinct timelines and were subject to distinct rounds of retaliatory tariffs. Sources: USITC for 2017 import values. See Table A1 for details on the set of relevant products and trade values.
Notes: Our analysis below covers only the 2018 rounds of tariffs.
2019, and a Phase 5 of tariffs against roughly $160 billion in December 2019. China once again retaliated with a plan for additional tariffs on U.S. exports to take effect with a similar timing.
As we highlight below, the effect of these tariffs on the U.S. manufacturing sector depends at least in part on how they impact global supply chains. U.S. manufacturers competing with Chinese imports would fare quite differently than manufacturers that rely on Chinese inputs in their U.S. production. For a rough guide for how these tariffs were split along this dimension, we apply the United Nations Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification to these tariffs (see also Bown, Jung and Lu (2019b) for a similar breakdown). 2 As shown in Appendix Figure B1 , the early U.S. tariffs predominantly covered intermediate goods,
represented by the blue areas of the section 232 and initial section 301 phases of U.S. tariffs.
There were some reports that this focus on intermediate goods over consumer goods was a purposeful effort on the part of the United States to shield U.S. consumers from any effects of tariffs. Sources: USITC for 2017 export values. See Table A2 for details on the set of relevant products and trade values.
Data and Measurement
This section describes the data sources and measurement for the empirical analysis presented in Section 3. We use publicly available data on the sets of products covered by U.S. import tariffs and foreign retaliatory tariffs. For U.S. tariffs, product lists are from the United States Chor (2019), Waugh (2019) and Bown, Jung and Lu (2019a) . We find that this assumption is justified because the value of U.S. exports that we classify as being covered by retaliatory tariffs lines up well with those calculated by other researchers as well as those announced by U.S. trade partners, as reported in Table A2 .
Our measures of exposure to the various rounds of tariffs imposed by the U.S. and its trading partners also require data on the value of overall imports, exports and shipments.
We collect data on the dollar value of U.S. imports and exports from the United States Statistics. Finally, we use the producer price index, also from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, to measure monthly changes in prices across industries.
Level of Aggregation
We conduct the analysis at the level of four-digit NAICS industries, which is the most detailed level at which comprehensive data for industrial production, producer prices, and employment are available at a consistent level of aggregation, with several exceptions. First, we separate aluminum manufacturing (NAICS 3313) into three sub-industries to reflect an important distinction within the industry that is impossible to ignore given the set of tariffs we study. Primary aluminum production (NAICS 331313) consists of establishments largely making aluminum from raw materials like alumina and bauxite. duction has made 4-digit NAICS detail increasingly uncommon in U.S. federal statistics. We have therefore used the 3-digit classification for these two industries. Data on manufacturing employment and producer prices also lack sufficient detail on the aluminum splits detailed above, and so we use the aggregate NAICS 3313. After factoring in the necessary aggregations, our baseline samples contain 76 industries for employment, 84 industries for industrial production, and 81 industries for producer prices.
Industry-Level Measures of Trade Policy Impact
This section describes the measures we construct to quantify the industry-level effects of the trade policies enacted by the U.S. and its trading partners in 2018. Our focus in constructing these measures is capturing the effect of realized changes in tariffs on forces likely to impact outcomes in the manufacturing sector, including the amount of import competition in the U.S. market, foreign demand for U.S. exports, and input costs. In particular, we construct three industry-level measures capturing each of these channels of potential trade policy impact. Uncertainty regarding trade policy may have led to additional effects; indeed, uncertainty has been a prominent focus of industry anecdotes as well as academic research (see, for example Caldara et al. (2019)).
New Tariff Import Share of Domestic Absorption
One of the most salient ways in which tariffs could affect an industry's economic activity is by restricting foreign competition. To measure the extent of this potential protection, we relate the scale of imports affected by new tariffs to the level of domestic absorption. Formally, let Ω I be the list of U.S. imported product-country pairs (pc) subject to new tariffs. The variables imp i and exp i identify total industry i imports and exports, and Q i equals domestic production. Then, the new tariff import share of domestic absorption is given by:
Throughout the remainder of the draft, we typically refer to this measure as an industry's degree of "import protection" from the 2018 tariffs. 4
In our baseline results, we calculate equation (1) for the cumulative set of tariffs from 2018 as a whole. 5 Table 1 lists trading partners responded to these tariffs by imposing retaliatory tariffs. These retaliatory tariffs may harm U.S. manufacturers by decreasing their competitiveness in foreign markets.
We measure this potential effect as the share of U.S. output that has been impacted by new retaliatory tariffs.
Defining Ω E to be the list of U.S. exported product-country pairs (pc) subject to retaliatory tariffs, we calculate the new tariff export share of output -which we refer to as an industry's exposure to "foreign retaliation" -as the following:
protection for each individual wave of tariffs. 6 Solar panels and modules are included in NAICS industry 334413; NAICS industry 3344 is listed as number 4 in Table 1 though this industry comprises a wide range of chips, microprocessors, and other electrical components.
Foreign Retaliation
The ten industries most affected by new foreign retaliatory tariffs (for 2018 as a whole) are shown in Table 2 . As is clear from the table, even the most affected industries experience increases in tariffs on less than 10 percent of their overall shipments. 7 
New Tariff Share of Costs
The final channel we study traces the impact of U.S. tariffs on input costs via supply chain linkages with foreign countries. The principal data on an industry's sources of inputs used in U.S. production are the input-output tables produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
At the core of these tables are the "make" and "use" tables. The "use" table provides a matrix use ij -the dollar value of commodity j used in industry i production, and similarly the "make" table provides a matrix make ij -the dollar value of commodity j produced in industry i production. It is helpful to first consider the overall share of an industry's costs coming from foreign sources. Define SC ij as the share of input costs of commodity j in industry i:
where the variable M i equals total intermediate uses of industry i, and Comp i equals compensation of employees of industry i. Then, define IS j as the import share of domestic supply of commodity j:
where here the variables imp j and Q j , are imports and output of commodity j, respectively. By multiplying the terms from equations (3) and (4) we arrive at the (implied) import share of costs in industry i from commodity j. Without additional detail on the sources of inputs across countries, here we must use the "proportionality assumption": that the distribution of the uses of imported commodities in an industry is proportional to domestic commodity usage. Summing across commodities j yields the total import share of costs for industry i. This implied import share of costs is given by:
We use data from the BEA's 2012 input-output tables, the most recent year available, updated with 2016 information on values of imports and shipments. To incorporate the more recent data, we separate our measure of input usage into two components. The first component, Equation (3) uses only data from the 2012 detailed I-O tables and measures the share of total costs of each commodity j for an industry i. The second component, Equation (4), uses the more recent data on output and imports. It is worth pointing out that we are only able to update equation (4) for manufactured goods, as annual output measures for non-goods are unavailable. For non-goods commodities, we will use the 2012 values that come from the IO-tables.
Finally, we construct our measure of an industry's share of costs subject to new tariffs to be the share of equation (5) that is covered by new U.S. import tariffs. We refer to this measure below as the degree of "rising input costs" for a given industry, and calculate it as follows:
where as before the term Ω I denotes the list of U.S. imported product-country pairs (pc) subject to new tariffs. 
Short-Run Impacts of Tariffs on Manufacturing
This section presents the differences-in-differences empirical strategy we use to estimate the relationship between recent tariffs and outcomes in the manufacturing sector and presents our baseline results.
Empirical Strategy
The distribution of our measures of tariff impacts across industries, shown in part in Tables 1,   2 , and 3 demonstrates the need for a systematic approach to decompose the impacts of tariffs on the manufacturing sector. Any bivariate relationship between an outcome measure and one of the channels identified above could end up conflating multiple, potentially offsetting effects on an industry. Hence, we will control for all channels of exposure to tariffs in our baseline specification, allowing us to calculate estimates of the effect of each channel holding the others constant, and determining which tariff channel dominates.
In addition, rather than designating a set period of time over which to analyze the effects of tariffs on the outcome variables, we adopt a flexible setup that allows the effects of each of the channels to vary over time. In particular, we interact the industry-level measures for each of the tariff channels with a full set of month dummies. This allows us determine the exact timing of any estimated tariff effects in high-frequency data, while also providing information on the presence of any differential pre-existing trends in outcome variables across industries.
Finally, recognizing that international trade will have industry-level effects even in the absence of changes in trade policy, we include additional controls that account for a baseline level of export and import exposure for each industry. 9 These controls should account for general exposure to international conditions such as changes in the value of the dollar and foreign GDP growth. In addition, these controls may also serve as a coarse proxy for exposure to trade policy uncertainty.
Our estimating equation is given by:
where 1(M t = t) indicates a monthly categorical variable, and the outcome of interest, y it , is either log employment, log output, or the log of the producer price index of industry i in time t.
One concern inherent in this type of differences-in-differences analysis is the issue of differing trends across industries prior to the implementation of new tariffs. We utilize two approaches to account for pre-trends. First, we replace the measure y it with the equivalent measure after removing an industry-specific trend in 2017 (denoted y it ), the last full year before the implementation of new tariffs. In a second approach, we estimate equation (7) and then follow Finkelstein (2007) by differencing out the pre-trend path for each coefficient, thereby arriving at a point estimate of the particular channel for the period of our study.
Specifically, for a given coefficient (say, the γ t coefficient above) we calculate the following:
where we utilize the average of March-May, 2018, as the approximate period (t = 0) of the cumulative 2018 tariffs, with the end period being the average of the last three months of our sample (June-August, 2019) and the pre-period being the average of three months from an equivalent number of months before (February-April, 2017). intermediates, suggesting that the effects of this channel take some time to manifest itself in manufacturing employment. This result, therefore, provides additional context for the aggregate trends shown in Figure 1 , in which manufacturing activity did not slow noticeably until the end of 2018. The middle column of panel A indicates a modest positive effect on employment associated with import protection, but these estimates are somewhat imprecise.
Results
Finally, the right column of panel A exhibits a negative effect of foreign retaliatory tariffs on U.S. manufacturing employment that is apparent immediately after retaliatory tariffs begin to be imposed. For all three sets of estimates shown in panel A of Figure 4 , coefficient estimates during the period prior to the implementation of tariffs are reasonably flat, though not always centered exactly around zero.
The first column of Table 4 provides alternative estimates of the relationship between the tariff channels and employment based on the de-trending approach from Finkelstein (2007) described above. These estimates are consistent with those reported in Figure 4 , and also provide a more straightforward way of characterizing their economic significance. We find that shifting an industry from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in terms of exposure to each of the three channels of tariffs is associated with a reduction in manufacturing employment of 1.4 percent, with the positive contribution from the import protection effect of tariffs (0.3 percent) more than offset by the negative effects associated with rising input costs (-1.1 percent) and retaliatory tariffs (-0.7 percent). 10 Panel B of Figure 4 presents the coefficient estimates pertaining to the relationship between tariffs and industrial production. Here, we see little evidence of significant impacts from the 2018 tariffs, on net, though there is a brief period of a negative relationship with the input cost channel in mid-2018 and a noticeable shift down in estimates toward the end of our sample. The estimates pertaining to the other channels -import protection and foreign retaliation -do not exhibit statistically significant patterns. Point estimates in column 2 of Table 4 similarly lack statistical significance.
Finally, panel C of Figure 4 indicates that these new tariffs had significant effects on producer prices, primarily through the pass-through of rising input costs (the left column).
There is also suggestive evidence that producer prices rose modestly through the import protection channel (the middle column); however, the estimates lack precision. Although one might expect negative effects on producer prices impacted by foreign retaliatory tariffs, we see no evidence for this in our analysis (the right column). In terms of economic significance, the estimates in column 3 of Table 4 indicate that an interquartile shift in exposure to rising input costs is associated with a 4.1 percent increase in factory-gate prices. (7) and (8) in the text. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
Discussion
The results presented in Figure 4 and Table 4 pertain to the set of tariffs enacted in 2018, with estimated effects through August 2019. As additional data become available, it may be possible to estimate effects of the Phase 4 tariffs against Chinese imports enacted in September 2019. Our results suggest that the effects of this later round of tariffs will be highly dependent on the composition of affected products. As shown in Appendix Figure   B1 , the September 2019 U.S. tariffs focused to a much greater extent on consumer goods rather than the intermediate inputs that were heavily targeted in the 2018 tariff actions.
Therefore, the input cost channel could play a smaller role in the effects of the 2019 tariffs on the manufacturing sector.
We also note that the longer-run effects of these tariffs could be qualitatively different than the short-run effects that we estimate here. On the one hand, there may be more substantial expansion of U.S. manufacturing activity in the longer-term as firms fully adjust their supply chains to avoid U.S. import tariffs, highlighting a potential longer lag structure for the import protection channel. That said, there is suggestive evidence that the United
States is not typically the immediate destination for production relocation from China due to increased tariffs. In the washing machine case studied in Flaaen, Hortaçsu and Tintelnot (2019) , firms first moved production to other East Asian countries (Thailand and Vietnam)
following China-specific antidumping duties imposed in mid-2017. After the later Section 201 tariffs against worldwide imports of washing machines (discussed above), these same firms did indeed shift some sizable production to the United States, though this occurred with substantial costs to consumers via rising prices.
Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of the tariff increases imposed by the United States and its trading partners in 2018 on outcomes in the U.S. manufacturing sector. We calculate measures of each industry's exposure to tariff changes via three channels: the import protection that comes when an industry's output is subject to U.S. tariffs, the increase in production costs resulting from tariffs on imported inputs, and the reduction in foreign competitiveness due to retaliatory tariffs in U.S. export markets. We then estimate the relationship between these measures of exposure to tariffs and manufacturing employment, output, and producer prices.
We find that the 2018 tariffs are associated with relative reductions in manufacturing employment and relative increases in producer prices. For manufacturing employment, a small boost from the import protection effect of tariffs is more than offset by larger drags from the effects of rising input costs and retaliatory tariffs. For producer prices, the effect of tariffs is mediated solely through rising input costs.
These results have implications for evaluating the effects of recent U.S. trade policy.
While one may view the negative welfare effects of tariffs found by other researchers to be an acceptable cost for a more robust manufacturing sector, our results suggest that the tariffs have not boosted manufacturing employment or output, even as they increased producer prices. While the longer-term effects of the tariffs may differ from those that we estimate here, the results indicate that the tariffs, thus far, have not led to increased activity in the U.S. manufacturing sector.
In addition, our results suggest that the traditional use of trade policy as a tool for the protection and promotion of domestic manufacturing is complicated by the presence of globally interconnnected supply chains. While the potential for both tit-for-tat retaliation on import protection and input-output effects on the domestic economy have long been recognized by trade economists, empirical evidence documenting these channels in the context of an advanced economy has been limited. We find the impact from the traditional import protection channel is completely offset in the short-run by reduced competitiveness from retaliation and higher costs in downstream industries.
Tables A1 and A2 provide additional information regarding the data on products covered by tariffs. Specifically, the tables report the value of trade-based on 2017 annual data from the U.S. Census Bureau-that we calculate was subject to new tariffs, along with comparisons to values of trade publicly announced by governments and those calculated by other researchers.
In addition, we provide links to sources of the lists of HS codes covered by new tariffs. Table A1 for details on the set of relevant products and trade values. Classification comes from the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) from the United Nations. Further details can be found here. Lightly shaded areas are used for tariffs imposed in late 2019, which fall outside the main period of analysis for this paper.
We also report coefficient estimates for the control variables used in equation (7). These variables-industry export share of output and industry import share of domestic absorptionare intended to capture any features of industry exposure to things like exchange rate movements or overall foreign growth; these effects may also capture some of the potential impact from increased uncertainty on international markets more generally. Figure B2 reports these results pertaining to employment, industrial production, and PPIs. Figure B3 presents the results from estimating equation (7) without first removing an industry-specific trend from each dependent variable. As indicated in the figure, there is evidence that some industries were on different pre-trends in terms of the outcome variables prior to the imposition of tariffs. For example, the estimates for employment, shown in Panel a of Figure B3 appear to be on upward trends with respect to rising input costs and foreign retaliation and a downward trend for import protection.
B.1 Alternative Specifications
As discussed in the main text, we control for these differing pre-trends by either detrending the dependent variable based on its 2017 linear trend or subtracting out the pre-trend following the approach in Finkelstein (2007) . Our approach, therefore, treats these time trends as resulting from independent random shocks that affect outcomes in each industry over the short term, rather than long-term trends associated with particular industry characteristics. This assumption seems reasonable given our use of high-frequency data focusing on a relatively short period of time. It is also supported by our finding, shown in Figure   B3 that the pre-trends often move in different directions for different tariff channels, even though measures of each of the tariff channel exposure variables are positively correlated with one another. Figure B4 presents results of regressions of the three outcome variables on individual tariff channel measures, one at a time, as opposed to including the three channels together in the same regression. Thus, Figure B4 shows the results of nine separate regressions, rather than three separate regressions as in Figure 4 in the main text.
B.2 Univariate Results
There are some similarities between these "univariate" regression results and the main results shown in Figure 4 . Figure B4 still finds negative relationships between employment and both the rising input cost and foreign retaliation channels. There are also important differences, however. While the middle column of Panel C in Figure B4 finds a positive relationship between the effects of import protection and producer prices, the equivalent panel in Figure 4 reveals that this result is not present once the measure for rising input costs is included in the regression.
B.3 Results by Tariff Wave
The main results presented in Figure 4 we typically find the most pronounced relationships with outcome variables coming from the March (steel and aluminum) and September (largest China 301 wave) waves of U.S.
tariffs. This is apparent, for example, in the effects of the rising input cost tariff waves on employment (Panel a of Figure B5 ) and producer prices (Panel a of Figure B7 ). Second, we find that producer prices respond quickly to tariffs. Panel a of Figure B7 shows producer prices rising immediately in response to the March and September rounds of tariffs. 
